China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia
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Throughout the past three decades East Asia has seen more peace and stability than at any time since the Opium Wars of 1839-1841. During this period China has rapidly emerged as a major regional power, averaging over nine percent economic growth per year since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in China, and Chinese exports have begun to flood the world. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and plays an increasingly visible role in international politics. In response to this growth, other states in East Asia have moved to strengthen their military, economic, and diplomatic relations with China. But why have these countries accommodated rather than balanced China's rise?
entire population of Osaka at current rice prices.71 Trade served as a double-edged instrument of system consolidation, for it facilitated not only more intense state-to-state interactions but also the development of domestic state institutions. Southeast Asia illustrates both processes. From roughly 1400 to the eighteenth century, the expansion of international trade within Southeast Asia, and between Southeast Asia and China, Japan, and Northeast Asia, resulted in a regionwide process of
corporate governance standards, nonperforming loans, and a weak equity market that does not discipline capital.29 In addition, as with East Asia a decade earlier, the international financial community sees China as an opportunity for explosive growth, and capital inflows into China have begun to approach bubble dimensions, where capital flows not because of a deep understanding and assessment of the opportunities in China, but rather because “everyone else is doing it.” This does not mean China
choice negative personal opinions about Kim Jong-Il (referring to Kim as a “pygmy” and how he “loathed” him), after which many speculated a dark future for U.S.-DPRK relations.80 As the crisis intensified, Colin Powell refused to consider dialogue with the North, remarking, “We cannot suddenly say ‘Gee, we’re so scared. Let’s have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.’”81 The South Koreans were concerned that the Bush administration’s open embrace of preemptive war as an
convinced that friendship between China and Vietnam would have to be restored.”88 Martin Stuart-Fox writes, “Burma and Vietnam have historically defeated Chinese armies, only to ensure their security by reinscribing in the Chinese world order. This was in no way humiliating, it was a sensible course of action.”89 Vietnam’s main political and economic model is China. For example, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien stated in 2001 that relations with China were the priority in Vietnam’s
foreign policy.56 Koizumi and Abe both come from this perspective. They view China as a potential threat, and although they advocate a military buildup, Richard Samuels notes that they “have eschewed identifying Japan as a great power… they continue to hew to the Yoshida rhetoric of Japan as a peace-loving nation.”57 Among this strategy’s supporters are the Japanese Defense Agency, conservative newspapers such as the Yomiuri Shimbun, and other elements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of